

1. Generalizations. The paper presents a sound partial analysis, and is concurred in except as noted below or in interlined comments. It is realized that in the absence of Part II it may be unwarranted to comment to this extent on Part I. The importance of the subject justifies a firm, definite and realistic presentation of the factors affecting the problem. As noted below, (a) some change of emphasis seems desirable, and (b) overt capabilities should continue to be exploited fully.

## 2. Assumptions.

Assumption (a) leaves out the point that if and when EDC comes into effect there will still be many obstacles to overcome. This addition is suggested: "However, even if ratified (which appears to be doubtful in the near future), there will still be numerous obstacles, particularly continued Franco-German rivalries, to be overcome before a viable EDC can be achieved.

Assumption (b) omits what the enemy will do. This addition is suggested: "During the next year(s), the USSR will continue its political warfare tactics designed to undermine European strength and unity and split the Western allies. In particular there is likely to be increased Soviet harassment of West Berlin, though not to the extent of a renewed blockade."

A new assumption might be desirable: "The French and Italian Communist parties, although slowly declining in strength, will remain a major social and political force, with substantial propaganda, subversive, and sabotage capabilities."

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As a new assumption, it might be important to mention that Italian-Yugoslavian difficulties will remain a serious obstacle to the development of Mediterranean defense.

3. The Primary Target. The draft, which lists various guiding points in NSC 114/2, is, however, directed principally towards one included factor in the statement of our security goals: the desirable objective of combatting anti-Americanism. It is strongly felt that any present statement of psychological strategy planning for Western Europe should recognize the continuing primary target as the Communist Party, or its manifestations in the several Western countries, and that our assets and capabilities should be directed towards that target.

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Emphasis in the draft on what is actually a secondary target tends to support an unprofitable defensive attitude and to reduce the effectiveness of planning aggressive action against the primary target. The situation in France well illustrates this point.

4. U.S. Capabilities Overseas. Para 3 of the draft considers essentially overt capabilities (SRE, USIE, et al), which may be marshaled against anti-American attitudes abroad. They should be exploited fully. Obvious corrections in approach, control, and techniques are required in the light of experience, to make such opinion as that noted on page 5 ("Most frictions . . .") no longer applicable. Such correction should be a matter of careful planning, emphasis and co-ordination rather than replacement of overt activities by covert measures. Recognition of errors in implementation should be of great value in corrective planning. The 10/2 activities referred to in Conclusions (page 9) can apply in this field only to a limited degree, and the capabilities of this Agency should not be directed to an essentially overt task.

In this connection, a caution may be useful as to too great emphasis on the indirect influence of U.S. official representatives abroad (Para 3 (a), page 3). The problem seems to be one of dealing with conviction with mass opinion. U.S. officials concerned with meeting this challenge must, of course, be thoroughly oriented in the economy, culture, and history of the countries where they are representatives, and their work must be based no less on understanding of the areas where they are on duty than on understanding U.S. aims. This appears to be purely in the overt field.

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5. U.S. Capabilities at Home.

a. An important part of the prevalent anti-US opinion in Europe is chargeable to legislative and official actions in the U.S. Examples: the administrative requirements of the Internal Security Act; the requirements of law which dictated demarches in Copenhagen with respect to tanker construction for the Soviets; negotiations for restriction on imports from Holland and Switzerland; reciprocal trade problems; and many others. This is recognized by all U.S. agencies involved, but in any case our overt activities overseas should in such instances not be held chiefly responsible for failure effectively to counteract unfavorable opinion. This problem deserves thorough study under NSC direction.

b. Media: The thought in Para 3 (i), page 5, relating to frictions caused by certain opinions spread through mass communications is important and does not seem to be adequately developed. We in the U.S. receive our principal impressions of Europe and Europeans from radio, newspapers, magazines and, to some extent, books. The mass of Europeans get their impressions of us in the same way.

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6. Positive Approach. The second paragraph of Conclusions (page 9) is referred to. The draft stresses reduction of antagonisms, which as noted in an earlier informal discussion of the subject is negatively phrased. The draft, however, should not unduly emphasize the defensive aspect of the planning situation confronting us. The limited planning objective in reduction of antagonisms should be clearly stated as an objective, not as "the broad objective of our psychological strategy." See para 1 above.

A possible emphasis in approach: create overseas, backed by strongly-led, strongly-expressed opinion in the U.S., a better understanding of the united opinion of the American people, expressed to the people of Western Europe in terms of their own self-interest. Attack along these lines should achieve more than defense of our attitudes and aims.

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8. Colonialism. It is felt that this subject merits separate consideration before other than passing reference to the U.S. role in working towards solution of the problem is included in Western European psychological strategy planning. Practically, undue attention to problems of colonization at this juncture can, as it recently has, blocked cordial relations with friendly powers.

9. It is the view of this Agency that its psychological warfare activities should be directed primarily against Communism and its manifestations; and should not be directed against anti-American opinion abroad except as they are incidental to 10/2 operations against Communism.

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